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Abstract
I study the impact of idiosyncratic risk on savings and employment in
a small open economy populated by two-member families. Families incur
a fixed cost of participation when both members are employed. Because
of market incompleteness and information asymmetries, this cost coupled
with labor market frictions can generate multiple equilibria. In particular,
there might be one equilibrium with high employment and low saving and
another one with low employment and high saving. The model predicts
that aggregate saving and employment rates are negatively correlated across
countries. I present empirical evidence that supports the general equilibrium
prediction of the model.
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1 Introduction
The study of aggregate saving has long been central to economics; however, there
are persistent differences in saving rates across very akin economies, which tra-
ditional models of capital accumulation do not explain well. Together, the life
cycle/permanent-income and the precautionary saving/buffer-stock models have
been the primary theoretical framework for explaining individual and aggregate
saving. Many different versions of the benchmark model of saving have been ex-
plored; however, seldom endogenous labor supply decisions are introduced and, in
most general equilibrium models of aggregate saving, employment is an exogenous
variable.
In this paper I provide an exposition of a model in which aggregate saving and
also equilibrium employment is the result of market interaction between firms and
a large number of families which face idiosyncratic risk. I model families as two
member households, which exhibit prudence, and therefore have a precautionary
saving motive. I consider a small open economy, in the sense that the interest rate
will be exogenous and should be interpreted as the world interest rate. The price
which is endogenous in equilibrium is the within household wage-gap between the
primary earner and the second family member. In the economy examined, when the
wage-gap is low, many families choose to have both members employed in equilib-
rium. Therefore, the aggregates saving rate is low, because two-earner families are
less exposed to idiosyncratic risk than single-earner families. If instead the wage-
gap is high in equilibrium, most families are single-earner and the aggregate saving
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rate is high because agents are vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks and rely heav-
ily on precautionary saving for self-insurance purposes. In turn, the equilibrium
wage-gap and the level of employment are determined by the interaction between
firms and workers, in a labor market characterized with frictions and asymmetric
information.
The corner-stone of this paper is a model of family labor supply, which captures
within household extensive margin labor supply interactions. To introduce a labor
market participation choice among household members, I follow Cho and Rogerson
(1987) and introduce within family labor supply decisions shaped by symmetric
preferences and fixed costs of participation which are incurred when both members
of the household are simultaneously in the labor force. Moreover, I pose the problem
in such a way that the second member labor supply acts as a source of insurance
against within family resources fluctuations. This hypothesis has some empirical
support. For example, Dynarski and Gruber (1997) find that families do a good job
at smoothing consumption in the face of changes in the head’s earnings. Moreover
they find that a substantial amount of within family consumption smoothing is
achieved through offsetting changes in other sources of family income, including
spousal earnings.
Because the value for the firm of hiring a worker depends on the attachment of
the worker to the firm, firms have to form rational expectations about the degree
of attachment of the worker to the labor force. The first member of the house-
hold is always employed, however, the second member enters and exits the labor
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force in equilibrium. Hence the equilibrium employment rate depends on the la-
bor force exit rate of the second household member, which is endogenous in the
rational expectations general equilibrium. Because of market incompleteness and
asymmetry of information and given that firms are not willing to pay the same
wage to workers with different degrees of attachment to the labor force, allowing
for family extensive margin labor supply choices can lead to multiplicity of equi-
libria. In particular we can have one equilibrium with high employment and low
saving and another one with low employment and high saving. The model suggests
that a rise in equilibrium employment rates, which translates into an increase in
the number of two-earner families, should lead to a lower aggregate saving rate,
as the variability of families disposable income decreases. If we interpret high em-
ployment rates among married women as a high employment equilibrium in the
sense defined above, at the aggregate level, the model predicts a negative correla-
tion between female labor force participation rates and aggregate saving. I present
empirical evidence which supports this general equilibrium prediction.
Moreover, the model is not mute about welfare. In the equilibrium with high
employment and low aggregate saving, firms are as well off as they would be in the
low employment/high saving equilibrium, because expected profits are always zero
given the existence of a free entry condition. However, in the high employment
equilibrium, households are better off because they solve the same inter-temporal
problem but wages are higher because of the lower gender wage-gap. Therefore,
the multiple equilibria can be Pareto ranked, and the paper thus offers insights
useful for policy-makers.
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Not many authors have investigated the impact of idiosyncratic risk on aggre-
gate saving allowing for endogenous labor supply. Notable exceptions are Marcet,
Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007) and Pijoan-Mas (2006). These authors find that in
a general equilibrium framework, and contrary to models with exogenous labor
supply, the presence of uninsurable labor income risk might lead to less aggregate
saving than under complete markets. Low (2005) analysis life-cycle labor supply
and saving in a partial equilibrium framework. He finds that when labor supply is
flexible, consumption is smoother than when work hours are exogenous. Further-
more, he argues that making labor supply flexible has an ambiguous impact on the
correlation between precautionary savings and earnings uncertainty, since on the
one hand the cost of accumulating precautionary balances is smaller, but on the
other hand the value of precautionary wealth holdings is less because households can
now adjust labor supply. Attanasio, Low and Sanche´z-Marcos (2005), explore the
role of female labor supply as an insurance mechanism against idiosyncratic earn-
ings risk within the family. They find that additional uncertainty increases female
participation rates. Another stream of work, pioneered by Chang and Kim (2006),
examines the implications of introducing cross-sectional heterogeneity caused by
lack of complete insurance markets for the aggregate labor supply elasticity and in
particular characterize the resulting reservation-wage distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I develop the model.
In section 3 I solve numerically for the model stationary competitive equilibria. In
section 4 I present relevant empirical findings which support the model prediction
and section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 Households and Preferences
The model economy is populated by a continuum (measure one) of infinitely lived
families. A family is a partnership between two members, a husband (m) and a wife
(f), which make an integrated choice over how much to consume and how many
hours each member works. To model the preferences of each household, I follow
Cho and Rogerson (1988) and, in particular, it is assumed that a family incurs a
fixed cost of participation when both members of the household are simultaneously
in the labor force. A family’s instantaneous utility is given by
u (c, ℓm, ℓf) = ln (c) + Φ(ℓm, ℓf)h¯,(2.1)
where c is the family’s consumption of market goods and Φ(ℓm, ℓf)h¯ is the family
consumption of home produced goods. Home-produced goods are non-traded and
can be used only as consumption. The family either produces (and consumes) h¯
home produced goods or none, depending on the choices for ℓm and ℓf , which are
the market hours worked by each respective member of the family. The technology
to produce home goods is captured by Φ(ℓm, ℓf):
Φ(ℓm, ℓf) =


1 if ℓmℓf = 0
0 else
.(2.2)
This home goods production function, implies that only families in which at least
one member is not supplying market hours are able to consume home produced
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goods. I abstract from the intensive margin and assume that each household mem-
ber can either choose to work ℓ¯ hours or stay at home, in which case ℓ = 0. Thus,
effectively the family incurs a fixed cost when both members of the household are
simultaneously employed because the home technology requires one full time worker
to yield output. Each period, families have to decide whether to have one or both
members employed.
The household member labeled m is the family primary earner and when employed
she earns market wage wm. When employed, the second household member earns
wage λwm ≤ wm. The within household wage-gap, λ, is an equilibrium price and
is endogenous. Since both family members have identical preferences and make an
integrated choice, given the within household wage-gap, the first household member
always chooses to be employed. Each family can store wealth, earning a constant
risk-free rate r, which should be viewed as the world interest rate in a small open
economy. However, borrowing cannot exceed a borrowing limit δ which I normalize
to zero. I also impose an upper bound on wealth holdings a¯. a¯ is chosen to be large
enough, so that this additional constraint never binds in equilibrium. I let at and
e˜t denote, respectively, family financial wealth, and an exogenous and idiosyncratic
expenditure shock (e.g.: medical expenditure), at time t.
The flow budget constraint of a family choosing to have both members employed
is given by
ct + e˜t + at+1 = wmℓ¯+ λwmℓ¯+ (1 + r) at.(2.3)
7
The flow budget constraint of a family choosing to have only the first member
employed is
ct + e˜t + at+1 = wmℓ¯+ (1 + r) at.(2.4)
The exogenous expenditure shock e˜t ∈ [0, e¯] is randomly i.i.d distributed across
families and time, and is drawn from the cumulative distribution F (e). Crucially,
the size of the shock as well as family wealth is private information and cannot
be publicly verified. The resources available to the family, net of the expenditure
shock are
z = (1 + r) a− e.(2.5)
Because shocks are i.i.d., z is the only relevant state variable for the household.
From the assumptions made about the support of a and e it follows that z also has
a finite support, [z, z¯]. Finally, notice that because of the extensive margin choice,
the family indirect utility function is not concave in general . In particular, let
V1 (z) and V2 (z) be, respectively, the value for the family of choosing to have only
one member employed or both members employed. Suppose both these functions
are concave. The family value function prior to the employment choice is given
by V (z) = max [V1 (z) , V2 (z)]. Clearly V (z) need not and, in general, will not be
concave. Thus the solution to the problem solved by families can be improved by
using lotteries over wealth1. With the purpose of convexifying the problem, the
1The need to use lotteries in non-convex economies is an issue raised in a number of papers,
notably Phelan and Townsend (1991), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Lentz and Tranaes
(2005). The last paper discusses in detail how to implement such a mechanism and in this paper
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following assumption is made:
Assumption 1 A family which has available resources z can invest in a complete
menu of lotteries yielding return zL, with probability α and return zH , with proba-
bility 1−α, and all lotteries are fair in the sense that their expected return is zero,
or equivalently, α = zH−z
zH−zL
. The menu of lotteries is complete in the sense that the
family can freely choose zL and zH , as long as zL, zH ∈ [z, z¯].
The timing of events in the economy with lotteries is specified as follows: The
idiosyncratic expenditure shock, e˜t, is realized; given wealth and the idiosyncratic
shock, each family can choose whether to invest in a lottery which yields zero
expected return; notice that non-participation is possible, simply by choosing the
lottery profile zL = zH = zt; finally, the lotteries are realized and each family makes
her saving and labor supply decisions. Thus, it is useful to define the value function
of a family at the second stage of the family program, after the idiosyncratic shock
has been realized, when the family must decide over which lottery to invest in:
VL (z) = max
zL,zH∈[z,z¯]
[
zH − z
zH − zL
V (zL) +
z − zL
zH − zL
V (zH)
]
.(2.6)
Notice that V L (z) is the concave envelope of V (z). Finally, at the final stage of the
household decision process, the two relevant value functions are V1 (z) and V2 (z).
The Bellman equation characterizing the problem of a household holding available
resources z (after the lottery realization) that chooses to have only the primary
earner employed is given by
V1 (z) = max
a′∈A
{
u
(
c, ℓ¯, 0
)
+ β
∫ e¯
0
VL (z′) dF (e)
}
,(2.7)
I define a mechanism which resembles strongly their own.
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where
c+ a′ = wmℓ¯+ z,
z′ = (1 + r) a′ − e˜,
a′ ≥ −δ.
And the Bellman equation characterizing the problem of a household that chooses
to have both members simultaneously employed is given by
V2 (z) = max
a′∈A
{
u
(
c, ℓ¯, ℓ¯
)
+ β
∫ e¯
0
VL (z′) dF (e)
}
,(2.8)
where
c+ a′ = wmℓ¯+ λwmℓ¯+ z,
z′ = (1 + r) a′ − e˜,
a′ ≥ −δ.
Households discount future utility at rate β, and β (1 + r) < 1 which implies that
absent uncertainty they would want to borrow against future consumption to fi-
nance current consumption. Consequently, the support of the household wealth
distribution has a finite endogenous upper bound (see Aiyagari [1994]).
The solution to the household problem is a threshold level
zT : V1
(
zT
)
= V2
(
zT
)
,(2.9)
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above which the household decides to have only one member, the primary earner,
employed and a pair of asset demand functions conditional on the number of family
laborers
aˆ1
′ = A1 (z; r, w, λ, δ) z > z
T ,(2.10)
aˆ2
′ = A2 (z; r, w, λ, δ) z ≤ z
T .
2.2 Firms and Labor Demand
Before characterizing equilibrium, I have first to model labor demand, coupled
with a zero profits/free entry condition. I assume that labor is the only factor of
production and that there are constant returns to scale. This allows me to model a
firm as a match between an employer and an employee. Firms compete for workers
a` la Bertrand and, given the equilibrium wage, workers choose whether to work or
stay at home. The wage rate is kept constant for as long as the match lasts and in
particular is not allowed to vary with worker tenure.
There are no search frictions and no barriers to entry. However, when a new match
of a worker and a firm occurs, the worker is less productive in the first period of
the match. The marginal productivity of the worker is y − κ in the first period of
the match and in the following periods and for as long as the match is kept, the
marginal productivity is y. This can be interpreted as firm specific human capital,
in an otherwise perfectly competitive labor market, which is entirely accumulated
in the first period of the match.2
2The absence of tenure-linked wage rules and the assumption that the productivity of workers
is less in the first period of the match are the labor-market frictions leading to wage-discrimination.
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The problem of the firm is characterized by the following Bellman equations in
discrete time
rJn = ℓ¯(y − κ− w) + (1− p)(Js − Jn),(2.11)
rJs = ℓ¯(y − w) + p (Jn − Js),(2.12)
where Jn is the value for the firm of creating a vacancy and Js is the value for the
firm of remaining in operation with the same worker as in the period before. The
wage rate is given by w and 0 < p < 1 is the probability of separation of the match
between the firm and the worker, which is endogenous in the rational expectations
general equilibrium. From (2.11) and (2.12) we obtain
Js − Jn =
ℓ¯ κ
1 + r
(2.13)
and the value of a vacancy can be written as
rJn = ℓ¯
(
y −
p+ r
1 + r
κ− w
)
.(2.14)
The free entry condition implies that in equilibrium Jn, the value of creating a
vacancy, must be zero and therefore the equilibrium wage rate is
w = y −
p + r
1 + r
κ.(2.15)
Consequently, in this economy there are two wage rules, one for workers of type
m and another one for workers of type f because p, the probability of a match
being destroyed, differs according to the worker type. Importantly, the worker
12
type is assumed to be publicly observed (in other words, firms know if the worker
is the family primary earner). Moreover the primary earner is always part of the
labor force and therefore firms forming rational expectations about pj, j ∈ {m, f},
set pm = 0. However, pf = P
(
ℓ′f = 0 | ℓf > 0
)
is not zero. Since the decision
of the second household on the extensive margin is not a trivial one, because of
the presence of the fixed cost h¯, the firms anticipate this when setting the wage
rate. It follows that in equilibrium, the wage-gap across the two types (the within
household wage gap) is
λ =
wf
wm
=
y (1 + r)− (pf + r)κ
y (1 + r)− rκ
.(2.16)
Finally, it is convenient to normalize y/κ and thus by setting y/κ = 1, we obtain
λ = 1− pf .(2.17)
2.3 General Equilibrium
Characterization of a recursive competitive equilibrium for a dynamic heteroge-
neous agent model would require that we keep track of the wealth distribution be-
cause the equilibrium prices depend on the distribution of wealth and the forecast of
agents about future prices depends on the law of motion for wealth. However, if the
solution of the households’ problem at given constant prices induces a stationary
distribution of wealth, then a stationary equilibrium exists, because in our model
economy there is no aggregate uncertainty and therefore, given a stationary distri-
bution of asset holdings, prices are constant. Following Huggett (1993), it can be
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shown that a stationary wealth distribution exists provided that: families’ wealth
holdings are distributed over a compact set; the policy functions are monotonic;
the monotone mixing condition is satisfied, which implies that every household has
a positive probability of visiting the entire wealth distribution in either direction.
All three conditions are satisfied.
Existence of a stationary distribution ensures the existence of constant prices, how-
ever this is not sufficient to establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium
because the free entry condition might generate prices which are not consistent
with household optimal behavior. However, by an appropriate choice of h¯, it is
possible to make sure that at least one stationary competitive equilibrium exists.
To see this, notice that by choosing h¯ small enough so that, when λ = 0, house-
holds always find it optimal to have both members employed, we obtain at least
one equilibrium, because if all households have both members employed, pf = 0,
but then the free entry condition will also be satisfied because λ = 1− pf = 0.
Household wealth is private information which firms cannot observe. Hence, the
rational expectations forecast of firms about pf depends only on the expectations
about next period prices and on the equilibrium law of motion of the wealth dis-
tribution. In the stationary equilibrium this is time invariant. The rational expec-
tation of firms over pf is
pf =
∫ zT (λ)
−(δ+e¯)
P
[
z′ ≥ zT (λ) | z = z∗
]
×
γλ (z)
Γ(z)
dz∗,(2.18)
where γλ (z) is the stationary probability density function of z, which depends on
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λ, and Γ(z) is the corresponding stationary cumulative density function.
On the households side, there is a continuum (measure one) of two member families,
indexed by i ∈ I , that have identical preferences and are subject to idiosyncratic
expenditure shocks ei. A stationary competitive equilibrium relies on household
behaving optimally given there wealth and prices (r, wm, λ), firms forming a rational
expectation about pf and a stationary wealth distribution Γ(z).
Definition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is defined by the pair (λ, pf) a
threshold level of resources zT (λ) and a stationary distribution Γ(z) for which
1. The policy functions
aˆ1
′ = A1 (z; r, w, λδ) z ≤ z
T ,
aˆ2
′ = A2 (z; r, w, λδ) z > z
T ,
solve the households’ optimum problem;
2. There is free entry of firms: λ = 1− pf ;
3. Firms are forming rational expectations about pf .
Figure 1 illustrates , for a given interest rate r, a possible shape for the locus defined
by equation (2.18), which I will call the pf -locus for ease of exposure. Notice that
for low values of λ the pf -locus is not defined since no household has both members
employed and therefore the set of individuals of type f employed has zero measure.
However, for completeness, I define pf = 1 to be the out-of equilibrium belief firms
form about pf when λ is too small for any type f individual to be employed. Thus,
I make the following assumption
15
1
Λ
1
pf
Figure 1: Determination of equilibrium λ and pf
Assumption 2 Let λ∗ be such that Γ(zT (λ∗)) = 0. Then a firm who finds a
worker of type f willing to work at wage λ∗wm will form expectation pf (λ
∗) = 1.
This will be called an out-of-equilibrium belief.
An analytical characterization of the pf -locus is not feasible and therefore charac-
terization of the stationary competitive equilibrium is a numerical exercise, which
I describe in the next section. The downward linear slope, which I will call λ-locus,
corresponds to equation (2.17). Clearly there may exist more than one equilib-
rium.3 Moreover, as mentioned before, h¯ is a free parameter which can be chosen
in such way to always ensure the existence of an equilibrium. In particular, be-
cause β (1 + r) < 1, the individual wealth holdings is bounded and the wealth
distribution has finite support. In particular there exists a z∗ (λ) such that for all
z ≥ z∗ (λ), z ′ ≤ z∗ (λ) with probability one (Aiyagari [1994]).
The following existence result can therefore be established:
3Strictly speaking a situation with pf = 1 and λ = 0 is a rational expectations equilibrium
in this economy however it is not an interesting one as it implies that no family chooses to have
both members employed. I therefore ignore this particular equilibrium in what follows.
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Proposition 1 Given an appropriate choice of h¯, such that ℓf (z
∗ (1)) = 1, there
exist always an equilibrium with full employment and a zero within family wage
gap, that is λ = 1. I call this equilibrium the non-discriminating equilibrium.
Proof: if h¯ is such that ℓf (z
∗ (1)) = 1 then, because participation is decreasing
in available resources, ℓf (z
′ (1)) = 1 with probability one and hence the rational
expectation of pf is zero and thus this is an equilibrium.
Finally, it is easy to verify that provided the non-discriminating equilibrium exists
and if h¯ is not too small, then there will often be a second equilibrium, a discrim-
inating equilibrium, for which 0 < λ < 1. Where h¯ not too small requires h¯ such
that for an arbitrarily small λ > 0 no family chooses to have both members em-
ployed. In particular, I show through numerical simulation that for many plausible
parameterizations, two equilibriums exist, one corresponding to a low λ and a weak
attachment of workers of type f to the labor force (high pf ) and another one with
a strong attachment and a high λ.
These two equilibriums obtained can be Pareto ranked. In the equilibrium with
high employment and low aggregate savings, firms are as well off as they would be in
the low employment high savings equilibrium, because of the free entry condition.
However, in the high employment equilibrium, households are better off because
they solve the same inter-temporal problem but facing a looser budget constraint.
Before discussing further how to solve for the model equilibrium, I investigate what
are the implications for employment and aggregate saving of varying λ, the within
family wage gap.
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Table 1: Aggregate Statistics Varying the Wage Gap
wage-gap separation rate participation wealth
λ pf rate income
0.05 1.00 0.00 0.43
0.15 0.94 0.01 0.40
0.25 0.85 0.06 0.29
0.35 0.68 0.29 0.13
0.45 0.49 0.56 0.10
0.55 0.28 0.76 0.10
0.65 0.13 0.88 0.10
0.75 0.04 0.96 0.09
0.85 0.01 0.99 0.09
0.95 0.00 1.00 0.08
Note: Parameters used in the simulations are β = 0.95, r = 3%, y = 100,
µ = 50, σe = 20 and h¯ = 0.6.
2.4 λ and Aggregate Saving
The non-convexity introduced by the fixed cost coupled with market incomplete-
ness and household private information about wealth holdings makes possible the
existence of multiple equilibria. In particular, often there are two equilibria: one
equilibrium where the wage gap is low (high λ) and the participation rates among
second household earners is high and another one with low λ and low participation.
Table 2.4 illustrates this point for a given parameterization of the model. The table
shows what is the effect of varying λ, for the participation rate of the second house-
hold earner as well as for the wealth/income ratio. This exercise clarifies what are
the partial equilibrium adjustments, as we move along the pf -locus. The main point
to note is that the separation rate pf decreases monotonically with λ, suggesting
a monotonically decreasing pf -locus. This finding is robust over wide range of pa-
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rameterizations. Moreover, the wealth/income ratio decreases as λ increases and,
in particular, the wealth/income ratio is lowest when λ approaches one.4 Thus,
assuming that the non-discriminating equilibrium exists and that there exists an-
other equilibrium (the discriminating equilibrium), the wealth/income ratio in the
discriminating equilibrium is higher than in the non-discriminating equilibrium.
Consider a group of economies which have all identical fundamentals; however,
suppose that for some reason they coordinate on different stationary competitive
equilibria: some economies coordinate in the discriminating equilibrium and the
remaining coordinate in the non-discriminating equilibrium. Employment will be
high and aggregate savings will be low in the economies which coordinate in the
non-discriminating equilibrium. It is in this sense that the model predicts that
saving and employment are negatively correlated across countries.
3 Solving the Model
To characterize equilibrium numerically, assuming that a stationary wealth dis-
tribution exists, I solve the household problem for a set of values for the gender
wage-gap λ. I solve the dynamic programming problem of the household via value
function iteration. The iteration is performed separately over the two conditional
value functions, V1 (z) and V2 (z) given a guess for V
L. To accelerate convergence,
I follow the suggestion in Aruoba, Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´res (2006). I start
4The wealth/income ratio corresponds to
∫
[z,zT ]A2 (z; r, w, λδ) dΓ(z) +
∫
(zT ,z¯]
A1 (z; r, w, λδ) dΓ(z)
y (1 + E(1− pf ))
,
where E is the employment among workers of type f .
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iterating on a small grid. Then, after convergence, I add more points to the grid,
and recompute the Bellman operator using the previously found value function as
an initial guess (with linear interpolation to fill the unknown values in the new grid
points). Iterating with this grid refinement, I move from an initial five-hundred-
point grid into a final one with five thousand points. The continuous distribution
for the random expenditure shock is replaced by a discrete distribution. The house-
hold can hold a single asset at ∈ [−δ, a¯]. After each iteration j for the conditional
value functions, I evaluate V j1 and V
j
2 over a dense grid zG of points and I obtain
VL
j+1
by obtaining the concave envelope of max[V j1 (zG) , V
j
2 (zG)]. Figure 2 plots
the two conditional value functions and the corresponding concave envelope, for a
given parametrization.
Once I have obtained both conditional value functions, I determine the threshold
level of resources zT above which families only have one member employed and I
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obtain the pair of policy functions. I simulate a history for each of a large number
of families (typically 10000). For each family I use the following procedure: in any
period, I begin with the level of assets from the previous period and multiply by
(1 + r). I draw random realizations for the expenditure shock e˜ from the corre-
sponding distribution to obtain the available resources z. I apply the policy rules.
This procedure yields end of period assets. Having obtained histories for a large
number of families, I obtain the aggregate wealth/income ratio and the equilibrium
separation rate by averaging over the last cross-section. Unfortunately, although I
allow for lotteries when solving for the optimal policy functions (by obtaining the
concave envelope of V) I do not implement it during the simulation stage. This
may cause a bias in the computation of the aggregate statistics however, provided
that there is enough uncertainty, the bias will be small.5 Once I have characterized
numerically the pf -locus I find the λ’s which satisfy the condition λ = 1− pf .
Figure 3 illustrates with a numerical example the possible multiple equilibria. The
net real rate of interest, r, is assumed to be 3% and in the benchmark parametriza-
tion of the model I assume that the discount factor, β, is 0.95. The expenditure
shock, e˜ is assumed to be normally distributed, with mean µ and variance σ2e .
6
Finally, ℓ¯ is set equal to one so that an employed worker of type m earns labor
income wm and an employed worker of type f earns labor income λwm, and y is
chosen to be 100. h¯ is chosen appropriatelly, to guarantee the existence of the
non-dicriminating equilibrium. In the example shown there are two equilibria: the
5See Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo, 2001.
6Effectivelly, e¯, the exependiture shock upper bound, will be the largest point in the support
of the discrete approximation to the shock’s distribution and e > 0.
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Figure 3: Equilibria: Numerical Example
non-discriminating equilibria, in which the saving rate is low and employment high;
and a discriminating equilibria in which the saving rate is high and employment is
low. For low values of λ (off-equilibrium) the rational expectation of firms about
workers of type f quickly rises to one, when no family ever chooses two have both
members employed. Although I am unable to prove that the number of equilibria
is at most two, for all parametrizations considered the number of equilibria was at
most two.
4 Some Empirical Evidence
A natural interpretation of the model examined in this paper is that one reason
why there are persistent differences in saving rates across countries is that the
equilibrium levels of employment differ across them. Moreover, these differences
in employment are to a large extent accounted for differences in female labor force
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participation across countries. In this section I test whether these differences can
help explaining cross-country variations in national saving rates, as predicted by
the model developed in the paper.
I estimate panel regressions over twenty-two countries including all the major
OECD countries,7 between 1980 and 2006. The dependent variable is net national
saving divided by net national product. Unlike private saving, national saving is
invariant with respect to inflation-induced transfers between the private and the
public sector. The baseline specification includes the per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) level and growth rate, the inflation rate measure using the GDP
deflator, the dependency ratio and finally the female labor force participation rate.
Moreover, in all specifications I have included an autoregressive term to capture the
dynamics of saving and time dummies, to control for time-specific effects.
The panel regression coefficient’s estimates are shown in table 2. Column (i) shows
the results from the OLS regression. The coefficient of GDP is positive and signifi-
cant. The coefficient of GDP growth is positive and significant, consistent with the
standard growth theory. The coefficient of the dependency ratio is small and not
significantly different from zero. The coefficient of the female participation ratio
is negative and precisely estimated, supporting the main prediction of the model.
Column (ii) is identical to column (i) except for the inclusion of fixed country ef-
fects. The results are appreciably different, however. In particular, the coefficient
of the female participation ratio is estimated to be -0.0368 with a t statistic of
7see table 3 in appendix for the list of countries.
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Table 2: Baseline regressions
i. ii. iii.
Variable OLS Fixed Effect Arellano-Bond
Female Participation -0.0459∗∗ -0.0368 -0.3335∗
(-3.40) (-0.80) (-2.10)
log GDP 2.5666∗∗ 7.3222∗∗ 18.2312∗∗
(3.33) (2.85) (3.67)
GDP growth 0.3938∗∗ 0.4979∗∗ 0.4453∗∗
(5.85) (6.75) (5.39)
GDP Deflator 0.0010 0.0163† -0.1094∗
(0.43) (1.83) (2.52)
Dependency Ratio 0.0145 0.1285† 0.4514∗∗
(0.43) (7.45) (4.29)
Lagged Net Saving 0.7864∗∗ 0.5911∗∗ 0.5117∗∗
(28.01) (16.70) (12.90)
R2: 0.49 0.51 -
Number of observations: 537 537 537
Number of countries: 22 22 22
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: The dependent variable is net national savings as a % of gross national in-
come. In parenthesis are t-values. The specification includes an intercept and timme
dummies.
-0.80; thus it is statistically insignificant although preserving the sign predicted by
the model and that found in the pooled OLS regression of column (i).
However, in the regression in column (ii) because the lagged saving rate is mechan-
ically correlated with the error term, the standard fixed-effect estimation is not
consistent in panels with a short time dimension. To deal with this problem, in
column (iii) I use the generalized method-of-moments estimator (GMM) developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991). The estimate for the coefficient of female partici-
pation is again negative, as predicted by the model, and statistically significant at
the five percent level.
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the interaction between equilibrium employment and ag-
gregate saving in an environment in which families can choose to have one or both
members employed. The main result is that because of information asymmetries
and the presence of fixed costs, there can be multiple equilibria. In particular we
may have one equilibrium with low employment and high aggregate saving and
another one with high employment and low aggregate saving.
The intuition for this result is simple. In the equilibrium with high employment
many families have both members employed and moreover the within-family wage
gap is smaller; consequently, families are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk and
accumulate less precautionary balances. Hence aggregate saving is low. In contrast,
in the low employment equilibrium, families are very exposed to idiosyncratic risk
and, consequently, aggregate saving is high.
In the equilibrium with high employment and low aggregate savings, firms are as
well off as they would be in the low employment/high savings equilibrium, because
of the free entry condition. However, in the high employment equilibrium, house-
holds are better off because they solve the same inter-temporal problem but wages
are higher because of the lower gender wage gap. Therefore, the multiple equilibria
can be Pareto ranked, and the paper thus offers insights useful for policy-makers.
In light of this result, one promising avenue for research concerns issues of optimal
taxation in contexts where labor markets are characterized with frictions.
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Finally, one natural interpretation of the model is that in countries where female
labor force participation is low the aggregate saving rate is high. This prediction
is empirically tested using panel regressions including all the major OECD coun-
tries and the empirical evidence supports the prediction of the model. Thus, the
results in this paper suggest that to understand persistent international differences
in aggregate saving it is important to consider the interaction between the labor
market equilibrium and families’ saving behavior.
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A Appendix
Table 3: OECD Net Saving and Female Participation
Country Net Saving Female Participation
Australia 5.913 60.526
Austria 8.330 57.437
Belgium 8.133 50.148
Canada 7.244 67.088
Denmark 5.799 75.066
Finland 7.026 70.959
France 7.307 58.740
Germany 5.770 63.627
Greece 12.993 45.600
Iceland 4.300 78.618
Ireland 13.180 46.881
Italy 8.249 44.067
Japan 13.724 57.430
Netherlands 10.758 57.252
New Zealand 4.467 65.300
Norway 13.018 71.281
Portugal 5.265 60.393
Spain 8.127 44.444
Sweden 8.459 77.804
Switzerland 15.263 64.657
United Kingdom 3.737 66.193
United States 4.510 67.214
Source: World Bank Development Indicators. Averages for the sample period
1980-2006.
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